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Florida Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1951], Art. 13
CASE COMMENTS

EQUITY PROCEDURE: DISPOSITION OF MOTIONS TO
DISMISS AND FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
Strong v. Clay, 47 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1950)
Proceeding under the new Equity Rules, complainant below secured
a temporary restraining order without notice. Within ten days after
service of the complaint, respondents below filed motions to dismiss
and for more definite statement, notifying complainant that these
would be called for argument on a date more than ten days after
service of the complaint. The circuit court refused a hearing because
these motions had not been argued within ten days after service of the
complaint, and denied a motion to dissolve the restraining order for
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Within twenty days
from service of the complaint respondents offered to file a sworn
answer, and moved to dissolve on complaint and answer; but the circuit
court refused both permission to file the answer and a hearing on the
motion to dissolve. On interlocutory certiorari, H=L, (1) refusal to
dissolve for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action was not
error; (2) the answer was properly submitted for filing; and (3) the
prescribed ten-day limit on motions to dismiss and for more definite
statement governs filing but not argument. Certiorari granted and
order denying motions to dismiss and for more definite statement, and
refusing to hear the motion to dissolve on complaint and answer,
quashed.
Florida Equity Rule 33(b) requires a motion to dismiss to be filed
within ten days after service of the adverse pleading; and Rule 33(e)
allows a motion for more definite statement within this same period,
provided responsive pleading has not already been interposed. The
instant case, following these rules, holds that the motions must be
filed within the ten-day period, but that neither motion need be heard
within that time. Parenthetically, the opinion expressly advises that
these motions should at the time of filing be definitely set for hearing,
with reasonable notice, not exceeding five days, to opposing counsel)
In discussing such hearing, however, the Supreme Court refers to
Rules 33(a)(1), (2) and 33(d), both of which apply to motion to
dismiss and neither of which applies to motion for more definite statelAt p. 824.
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ment, and then adds that "If the motion is overruled, responsive pleading will follow under Rule 83(a) or as the Court directs." 2 Although
this rule mentions motion to dismiss only, the filing of which clearly
alters the time allowed for interposing responsive pleading, 3 the statement just quoted unfortunately implies that both motions affect this
period. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the Florida Rules in conjunction with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were relied
upon heavily in drafting the Florida Rules,4 logically leads to the
opposite conclusion. Florida Equity Rule 33(a) by its terms limits
itself to motion to dismiss, whereas the federal rule from which it was
adapted 5 applies expressly to all motions allowable thereunder, including motion for more definite statement." This deliberate omission
in the Florida Rules indicates strongly that their promulgators considered the problem and decided that a motion to dismiss should be
the only one altering the time allowed for entering a responsive
pleading. This is the view expressed both by the chairman of the
committee representing the bar in drafting these very provisions 7 and
by the able author of the new Volumes 30 and 31 of Florida Statutes
Annotated.8
2lbid.
3

FLA. EQ. R. 33(a)(1),(2). The operation of its counterpart, FLA. C.L.R.
13(a) (1), (2) is now settled by Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Lake County Citrus Sales,
Inc., 48 So.2d 922, 923 (Fla. 1950): "Under this rule a defendant is ordinarily
required to file an answer to the complaint within 20 days after the service of the
summons upon him, or not later than the day fixed in the notice by publication, if
fixed in the notice. However, where by motion to dismiss the defendant sets up
any of the claims or defenses authorized by Common Law Rule 13(b), 30 F.S.A.,
the motion has the effect of tolling the period for filing the answer until the court
either has entered an order denying the motion or has entered an order that it
intends to postpone a ruling on the motion until some later time. After notice of
the entry of such an order the defendant is required to file his answer to the
complaint within 10 days, unless the court in its order fixes a different time for
the answer to be filed."
4
See Wigginton, New Florida Common Law Rules, 3 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 1
(1950) passim (dealing inter alia with FLA. C.L.R. 13(a) and 13(d), which are
identical with FLA. EQ. R. 33(a) and 33(d) in phraseology and have the same
historical background).
5
FEa. R. Civ. P. 12(a) (pursuant to which, however, motion to dismiss is
today best referred to in federal practice as motion for judgment for defendant).
6
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e) is embraced in 12(a), Faske v. Radbill, 7 F.R.D. 234
(E.D. Pa. 1946). Amendment of Dec. 27, 1946, to 12(e), to eliminate bill of
particulars, is irrelevant to the point here involved.
7
Wigginton, supra note 4, at 11, n.52.
8
rribble, Author's Comment, 30 F.S.A. 261 (1950), dealing with FLA. C.L.R.
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